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ABSTRACT
This paper summarizes our recent research on evaluating the distributional consequences of social
programs. This research advances the economic policy evaluation literature beyond estimating assorted
mean impacts to estimate distributions of outcomes generated by different policies and determine how
those policies shift persons across the distributions of potential outcomes produced by them. Our
approach enables analysts to evaluate the distributional effects of social programs without invoking the
“Veil of Ignorance” assumption often used in the literature in applied welfare economics. Our methods
determine which persons are affected by a given policy, where they come from in the ex-ante outcome
distribution and what their gains are. We apply our methods to analyze two proposed policy reforms in
American education. These reforms benefit the middle class and not the poor.
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Evaluating public policy is a central task of economics. Welfare economics presents dif-
ferent criteria. Research on program evaluation develops and applies a variety of di¤erent
econometric estimators. Traditional empirical methods focus on mean impacts. Yet mod-
ern welfare economics emphasizes the importance of accounting for the impact of public
policy on distributions of outcomes (Sen, 1997, 2000). A large body of empirical evidence
indicates that people di¤er in their responses to the same policy and act on those dif-
ferences, and that the representative agent paradigm is a poor approximation to reality
because the marginal entrant into a social program is often di¤erent from the average par-
ticipant. (Heckman, 2001a). This evidence highlights the importance of going beyond the
representative agent framework when evaluating public policies.
This papersummarizes our recentresearch on evaluatingthedistributional consequences
of public policy.1 Our research advances the economic policy evaluation literature beyond
estimating assorted mean impacts to estimate the distributions of outcomes generated by
di¤erent policies and to determine how those policies shift persons across the distributions
of potential outcomes produced by them. We distinguish the average participant in a
program from the marginal entrant.
Our research advances the existing literature on evaluating the distributional conse-
quences of alternative policies beyond the “Veil of Ignorance” assumption used in modern
welfareeconomics (See Atkinson1970, Sen 1997, 2000). Approaches basedon that assump-
tion compare two social states by assuming that the position of any particular individual
in one distribution should be treated as irrelevant. In this approach the overall distribution
1Carneiro, Hansen and Heckman (2000, revised 2001).
1of outcomes is all that matters. This is a consequence of the anonymity postulate that is
fundamental to that literature. Anonymity is the property that only the distribution of
outcomes matters and that reversing the positions of any two persons in the overall distrib-
ution does not a¤ect the evaluation placed on the policy (or state of a¤airs) that produces
the distribution.
There are normative arguments that support this criterion. (See Harsanyi, 1955, Vick-
ery, 1960, and Roemer, 1996). As a positive description of actual social choice processes,
the “Veil of Ignorance” seems implausible. Participants in the political process are likely
to forecast their outcomes under alternative economic policies, and assess policies in this
light. (Heckman, 2001b). This paper extends current practice by developing and applying
methods that forecast how people fare under di¤erent policies. We link the literature in
modern welfare economics to the treatment e¤ect literature.
This paper proceeds as follows. We brie‡y present the evaluation problem for an econ-
omy with two sectors (e.g. schooled and unschooled) where agents select or are selected into
“treatment” (one of the two sectors). We consider policies that a¤ect choices of treatment
(e.g. schooling) but not potential outcomes (the outcomes they experience under di¤er-
ent treatments). We compare outcomes across two policy regimes that a¤ect treatment
choices. This task is much easier when individuals respond in the same way to treatment
than when they di¤er in their response totreatment, and act on those di¤erences in making
treatment choice decisions. In the latter case, the marginal entrant into schooling is not
the same as the average participant in treatment and the representative agent paradigm
breaks down. In an appendix, we show how to generate the counterfactual distributions of
outcomes produced by alternative policies.
Weapply our analysis toestimatethedistributional consequencesof twoproposedpolicy
2reforms in American education. Even though the two policies barely a¤ect the overall
distribution of outcomes, and so would be judged to be equivalent to the pre-policy origin
state under the Veil of Ignorance criterion, they have substantial e¤ects on a small group
of people concentrated in the middle to the high end of the pre-policy wage distribution.
Marginal entrants attracted into college get smaller gains than average college students
suggesting diminishing returns to programs that encourage college enrollment. Marginal
entrants into junior college are about the same as average entrants, suggesting constant
returns for that schooling level. Since most of the people a¤ected by the policies come from
the middle to the high end of the original wage distribution, there is little impact of these
policies on the poor.
2 The Evaluation Problem for Means and Distribu-
tions
In order to place our work in the context of the current literature on social program eval-
uation, and to link it to the economics of education, it is helpful to consider a simple
generalized Roy (1951) economy with two sectors. Let S =1denote college and S =0
be high school. Persons (or their agents, such as their parents) can choose to be in either
sector. There are two potential outcomes for each person (Y0;Y 1), only one of which is ob-
served, since it is assumed that only one option can be pursued at any time. For simplicity,





1 if I = Y1 ¡Y0¡ C ¸ 0,
0 otherwise.
Here C is the cost of choosing S =1 . In the context of a schooling model, C is tuition
or monetized psychic cost, while Y1 ¡ Y0 is the net gain from schooling expressed, say, in
present value terms.
We decompose Y1 and Y0 in terms of their means ¹1and ¹0 and mean zero idiosyncratic
deviations (U1;U 0) or residuals:
Y1 = ¹1 + U1
Y0 = ¹0 + U0.
We condition on X variables, but for notational simplicity we keep this dependence implicit.
Decomposing C in a similar fashion, we may write:
C = ¹C + UC;
so that
I = ¹1 + ¹0 ¡ ¹C +( U1¡ U0 ¡ UC):
It is fruitful to distinguish two kinds of policies: (a) those that a¤ect potential out-
comes (Y0;Y 1) through price and quality e¤ects and (b) those that a¤ect sectoral choices
(through C) but do not a¤ect potential outcomes. Tuition and access policies that do
4not have general equilibrium e¤ects fall into the second category of policy. Policies with
general equilibrium e¤ects and policies that directly a¤ect rewards to potential outcomes
and quality are examples of the …rst kind of policy. It is the second kind of policy that
receives the most attention in empirical work on estimating economic returns to schooling
(see e.g., the survey by Card (1999)) or in evaluating schooling policies (see e.g., Kane
(1994)).
Consider two policy environments denoted A and B. These produce two social states
for outcomes that we wish to compare. In the general case, we may distinguish an economy
operating under policy A with associated cost and outcome vector (Y A
0 ;YA
1 ;CA) for each





. Policy interventions with no e¤ect on potential outcomes can be described
as producing two choice sets (Y0;Y 1;CA) and (Y0;Y 1;CB) for each person. In this paper
we focus on evaluating the second kind of policy that keeps invariant the distribution of
potential outcomes across policy states, but a¤ects the cost of choosing sector 1 within
each state.
Our framework di¤ers in its emphasis from the standard model of modern welfare eco-
nomics. Analysts writing in that tradition focus on the distribution of outcomes produced
by each policy without inquiring how those outcomes are produced. All policies that pro-
duce the same aggregate outcome distributions are judged to be equally good. The details
of how the observed distribution is produced are deemed irrelevant. The distinctions we
make between policies that a¤ect potential outcomes and policies that a¤ect which poten-
tial outcomes are selected are also ignored in that literature. There is no explicit discussion
of sectoral choice within policy states. The literature starts, and stops, with an analysis













where SAand SB areschoolingchoice indicatorsunder policies Aand Brespectively, without
inquiring more deeply into the sources of the di¤erences in the distributions of outcomes.
The modern treatment e¤ect literature focuses on these details and distinguishes choice
of treatments from the treatment outcomes. However, it only inquires about certain mean
treatment e¤ects. The operating assumption in the literature is that policies do not a¤ect
potential outcomes (so (Y A
0 ;YA
1 )=( Y B
0 ;YB
1 )); but do a¤ect choices of sectors.
This literature distinguishes three cases. Case I arises when everyone (with the same
X) gets the same e¤ect from treatment (Y1¡Y0 is the same for everyone). Case II occurs
when Y1 ¡ Y0 di¤ers among people of the same X but decisions to enroll in the program
are not a¤ected by these di¤erences:
Pr(S =1 jY1 ¡ Y0)=P r ( S =1 )
Case III occurs when Y1¡ Y0 di¤ers among people and people act on these di¤erences. In
cases I and II, the marginal entrant into a program is the same as the average entrant. In
caseIII, this is not so. People select in parton gains. If they select solely on gains, then the
marginal entrant gets a lower return than those participants (in 1) who are inframarginal;
that is, the marginal treatment e¤ect (MTE)
E(Y1¡ Y0jI =0 )<E(Y1 ¡ Y0jS =1 )
6See Heckman 2001a for more discussion of the various treatment e¤ects.2
3 Comparing Two Policy States
Consider two policies, A and B, that a¤ect sectoral choices without a¤ecting the dis-
tributions of potential outcomes. For concreteness, we can think of these as policies that
a¤ect C (e.g., tuition or access) by shifting its mean, changing its variance or changing the
covariance between C and (Y0;Y 1). Each policy produces a distribution of outcomes. For
concreteness, think of the outcome as wages associated with di¤erent schooling levels.
In the literature on evaluating inequality, comparisons of policies are made in terms of
comparisons of distributions. If policy B produces an aggregate distribution of wages that
stochastically dominates that produced from policy A, B is preferred.3 The details of who
bene…ts or loses from the policy are considered to be irrelevant as a consequence of the
anonymity postulate.
The literature on evaluating inequality in modern welfare economics compares two
aggregate outcome distributions. If policy A has been implemented, but policy B has
not, evaluation of B entails construction of a counterfactual aggregate outcome distribu-
tion. Under the assumptions used in the treatment e¤ect literature, all that is required is
determination of how policy B sorts persons into sectors “0”a n d“ 1”, and how such sort-
ing a¤ects observed outcome distributions in sectors “0”a n d“ 1”. In our example, what
is required is a schooling choice equation and a selection model to identify the invariant
potential outcome distributions. The selection model enables analysts to go from observed
2Bjorklund and Mo¢tt (1987) introduced the marginal treatment e¤ect into the evaluation literature.
See Heckman (2001a) for a summary of extensions of this literature.
3See Sen (1997).
7(selected) distributions of Y0 and Y1 to the population potential distributions. With suf-
…cient individual variation in C within an economy governed by policy A, it is possible
to accurately forecast the e¤ect of policy B on the overall distribution without previously
observing it, as we demonstrate in this paper.
Our approachto the evaluation of public policy is more ambitious in some respects than
the recent literature in welfare economics and is more in line with the objectives of modern
political economy. (Persson and Tabellini, 2000). We relax the anonymity postulate
and determine how individuals at di¤erent positions within the initial overall distribution
respond to policies in terms of their treatment choices and gains. We estimate the number
of people directly a¤ected by the policy, where they start, and where they end up in the
overall distribution.
In the context of the treatment e¤ect framework, this task is broken down into two
sub-tasks. The …rst sub-task is to determine who shifts treatment state in response to the
policy and where they are located in the initial overall distribution. The second sub-task is
to determine where they end up in the overall distribution after taking the treatment, and
how much they gain. Since this approach assumes that potential outcome distributions
are not a¤ected by the policies, it is less ambitious, in this respect, than the approach
advocated in modern welfare economics which entertains that possibility.
Under case I, this task is greatly simpli…ed. Everyone who shifts from “0" to \1"gets
the same gain ¢. The only problem is to …nd where in the initial overall distribution the
switchers are located. Under case II, ¢ varies among observationally identical people. The
gain is not necessarily the same for persons with di¤erent initial Y0 values. However, on
average, across all movers, the gain is the same as the mean di¤erence between the two
potential outcome distributions within policy regime A: Hence the marginal entrant has
8t h es a m em e a na st h ea v e r a g ep e r s o na n dt h ea v e r a g ep a r t i c i p a n t :
E(Y1 ¡ Y0jI =0 )=E(Y1 ¡Y0)=E(Y1¡ Y0jS =1 ) :
Case III di¤ers from case II in that in general the gains to the average switcher are
not the same as the gains to the previous participants. If (Y1¡ Y0) is positively correlated
with I = (Y1¡Y0¡C); the marginal entrant receives lower gains on average than does the
average participant. The details of constructing the transition densities for the switchers
are presented in our companion paper.
4 Identifying Counterfactual Distributions Under Treat-
ment E¤ect Assumptions
Identifying the joint distribution of potential outcomes under treatment e¤ect assump-
tions is more di¢cult than identifying the various mean treatment e¤ects.4 The fundamen-
tal problem is that we never observe both components of (Y0,Y1) for anyone.5 Thus we
cannot directly form the joint distribution of potential outcomes (Y0;Y 1).
In the Appendix, we review various approaches to estimating, or bounding, counterfac-
tual distributions that have appeared in the literature. In our source paper, we develop a
new method for identifying these distributions. It is based on an idea common in factor
4A large econometric literature identi…es the mean impacts under a variety of assumptions. See Heck-
man, LaLonde and Smith (1999) for one survey. Heckman and Vytlacil (2000, 2001) consider identi…cation
of marginal treatment e¤ects and unify the treatment e¤ect literature.
5Panel data estimators sometimes enable analysts to observe both components. See Heckman, LaLonde
and Smith (1999).
9analysis but applied to model counterfactual distributions. If potential outcomes are gen-
erated by a low dimensional set of factors, then it is possible to estimate the distributions
of factors and generate distributions of the counterfactuals. Here, low dimensional refers
to the number of factors relative to the number of measured outcomes. See the Appendix
for the intuitive idea that motivates the analysis in our source paper. We next turn to an
application of our analysis to American data.
5 Some Evidence From America on Two Educational
Reforms
Our companion paper uses data on wages, schooling choices and covariates for white
males from the National Longitudinal Study of Youth (NLSY) to estimate a three factor
version of the model described in the Appendix using a Bayesian semiparametric mixture of
normals econometric framework. We consider four schooling levels: dropout, high school
graduate, junior college and four year college. We use local labor market variables, tuition
and family background information to identify the model. The estimated model …ts the
data well. Observed wage distributions are closely approximated. There is no need for more
than three factors to …t our data which includes panel data measurements on wages as well
as indicators of ability and motivation.6
Our paper estimates models for a variety of schooling groups. Here, for the sake of
brevity, we focus only on certain key empirical results. We report the wages returns to
college and high school, and selection on levels and gains into those schooling categories.
6The factor model is strongly overidenti…ed so that it would have been possible to estimate many more
than three factors.
10We analyze two policies: (a) a full tuition subsidy for junior colleges and (b) a policy
promoting access to four year colleges which places an institution in the immediate vicinity
(the county of residence) of each American. We consider only partial equilibrium treatment
e¤ects and do not consider the full cost of …nancing the reforms.
Our evidence shows considerable dispersion in terms of levels and returns (gains) to
various schooling categories. Indeed, ex post returns are negative for a substantial fraction
of people. There is little evidence of selection either on levels or gains for high school
graduates. There is a lot of evidence of selection on levels and gains for college graduates.
The marginal entrants into four year colleges induced by the access policy we consider have
wage outcomes below the average college participant both in terms of levels and gains.
This is not true for the junior college tuition subsidy policy we also analyze. For that case,
there is little impact on overall quality of junior college graduates.
Figure 1 shows the potential high school wages for all four schooling groups– what
people who actually attend various schooling levels would have earned had they gone to
high school. The four densities are nearly the same suggesting that there is little evidence
of selection on levels into high school. Three of these four densities are counterfactual. The
density for high school graduates is factual. For college (Figure 2), there is strong evidence
of selection on levels. Persons who attend college do better in college than dropouts, high
school graduates or junior college graduates would do. This result contrasts sharply with
the corresponding result for the factual and counterfactual wage densities for high school
graduates.
There is also little evidence of selection on gains (Y1¡Y0) to high school (high school vs.
dropout). See Figure 3 which plots the counterfactual returns to high school for all four
schooling groups. The returns (high school vs. four year college) are greater for persons
11who become college graduates than for the other schooling groups, although there is a lot
of overlap in the distributions. See Figure 4. Ex post many persons who actually stop their
schoolingatthe high school level would make …ne collegegraduates. Many college graduates
experience negativereturns. Themarginal treatment e¤ect comparing highschool to college
(Figure 6) suggests that as the unobservables that lead to a higher likelihood of attending
college increase, (soP(S=1) increases) the return to college increases. People most likely to
attend college have the highest marginal returns. The corresponding …gure for the return
to high school is ‡at, suggesting that the marginal participant has the same return as the
average participant.
Using the estimated model, we compare two policies: a full subsidy to community
college tuition and a policy that places a four year college in each county in America.
Table 1 shows the average log wages of participants before the policy change and their
average return. It compares these levels and returns with what the marginal participant
attracted into the indicated schooling by the policy would earn. Marginal and average log
wages and returns are about the same for the community college policy. There is little
decline in quality among the entrants. For the access policy, there is a sharp di¤erence.
Average participants in four year colleges earn more and have higher returns than marginal
entrants. There is a sharp decline in the average quality of college graduates.
Despite the substantial sizes of the policy changes we consider, the induced e¤ects on
participation are small. The four year access policy only raises four year graduation rates
by 1.3 percent. The junior college subsidy raises attendance at those institutions by 3.8
percent.
The policies operate unevenly over the deciles of the initial outcome distribution. Mo-
bility is greatest at the center of the distribution for the community college policy. See
12Table 2 and Figure 6. Mobility is from the top of the initial wage distribution for the four
year college policy. See Table 3 and Figure 7. Neither policy bene…ts the poor.
Our approach to the evaluation of social policy is much richer, and more informative,
than an analysis of aggregate outcomes of the sort contemplated in modern welfare theory.
The overall Gini coe¢cient does not change (totwo decimal points) when we implement the
two policies. By the standards of that literature, the pre- and post-policy distributions are
the same. A focus on the aggregate outcome distribution masks important details which
our approach reveals. Only a small group of persons are directly a¤ected by the policy.
The vast majority of persons would be una¤ected by these policies, and presumably, would
be indi¤erent to the policy.7 Our approach to policy evaluation lifts the Veil of Ignorance
and provides a more complete interpretation of who bene…ts from the policy and where
bene…ciaries come from in the overall distribution of outcomes.
6 Summary and Conclusions
This paper summarizes our recent research on evaluating the distributional conse-
quences of social programs. We move beyond the mean treatment e¤ects that dominate
discussion in the recent applied evaluation literature to analyze the impacts of policy on
distributions of outcomes. We develop and apply methods for determining which persons
are a¤ected by the policy, where they come from in the initial distribution, and what their
gains are.
We contrast the outcomes of participants in schooling before the policy change with the
outcomes of marginal entrants induced into the treatment state by the policy. We compare
7Counting their tax burden, they might even be hostile to these policies.
13our approach to the approach advocated in modern welfare economics. That approach
focuses attention solely on the aggregate distribution and does not identify gainers and
losers from a policy. Our approach identi…es where gainers and losers are located in the
overall distribution. The output produced from our approach generates the information
required in positive political economy.
Our analysis has been conducted for a partial equilibrium treatment e¤ect model that
assumes that policies do not a¤ect the distribution of potential outcomes, just the choice
probabilities of particular treatments. It would be desirable to extend our framework to
analyze the e¤ects of more general policies that a¤ect both outcome distributions and
choices using the general equilibrium framework described in Heckman (2001b). We leave
that task for another occasion.
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17Appendix
Identifying Counterfactual Distributions Under Treatment E¤ect Assumptions
Heckman and Honoré (1990) show that in the context of the original Roy (1951) model
under normality or exclusion restrictions, it is possible to identify the joint density of po-
tential outcomes. The original Roy model sets C =0 . Sectoral choices are then determined
solely by potential outcomes. This extra information identi…es the full model and lets ana-
lysts identify the joint distributions of outcomes across policy states. If there is variation in
C across persons, this method breaks down and it is only possible to identify g(Y0jS =0 )
and g(Y1jS =1 ) ; the conditional densities of the potential outcomes, as well as Pr(S =1 ) ;
but not the joint density, g(Y0;Y 1) (Heckman (1990)). Another special case that is dis-
cussed in Heckman (1992), is case I where Y1 ´ Y0 +¢ ,a n d¢ is a constant. Then from
the marginal distribution of Y0 or Y1 it is possible to form the joint distribution (Y0;Y 1)
whichis degenerate. HeckmanandSmith (1993) andHeckman, Smith and Clements (1997)
generalize this case to assume that the persons at the qth percentile in the density of Y0 are
at the qth percentile of Y1. Even without imposing this information, from the marginals it
is also possible to bound the joint densities using classical results in probability theory. In
practice these bounds turn out to be rather wide (Heckman and Smith (1993); Heckman,
Smith and Clements (1997)).
In our source paper (Carneiro, Hansen and Heckman (2001)), we generate the distrib-
utions of potential outcomes using a panel data factor structure model. For the details of
our method we refer the reader to our source paper. Here we present the intuitive idea
that underlies our method and in the text we report its application. We discuss the most
18elementary case, leaving a complete discussion of the more general case for our companion
paper.
Suppose that the mean of C depends on shifter variables Z that do not a¤ect (are
independent of) potential outcomes (Y0;Y 1). These are instruments. Suppose that for
some values of Z within available samples we observe
Pr(S =1 jZ) : =1 Z 2Z 1
while for other values of Z
Pr(S =1 jZ) : =0 Z 2Z 0:
Thus if Z is tuition, people who face a low tuition cost (possibly even a large subsidy) are
almost surely likely to go to college while those who face a very high tuition cost are almost
certainly likely not to go to school.8 We assume that the distribution of potential outcomes
is the same in these subsets as they are in the overall distribution. Thus we can identify
the marginal distribution of Y1 from the …rst sample and the marginal distribution of Y0
from the second sample.
Within these samples, we observe post schooling outcomes
Y0t;t =1 ;:::;T; for Z 2Z 0;
Y1t;t =1 ;:::;T; for Z 2Z 1:
From these data we can form the joint densities of each outcome over time on f(y01;:::;y0T)
8This is the version of identi…cation at in…nity discussed in Heckman (1990).
19and f(y11;:::;y1T); but not the joint densities over time over both outcomes.
Now suppose that Y0t and Y1t are both generated by a common factor f (e.g., ability,
motivation) so that
Y0t = ¹0t + ®0tf + "0t;t =1 ;:::;T;
Y1t = ¹1t + ®1tf + "1t;t =1 ;:::;T;
where the "0t and "1t are mutually independent of each other, f,a n da l lo t h e r"0t0;"0t00;t6=
t0;t 00.9 All of these error components are assumed to have mean zero. A common factor
generates both potential outcomes. If we can get our hands on the distribution of the
common factor, we can compute the joint distribution of counterfactuals.
Within each regime we can compute the following covariances:
Cov(Y0t;Y 0t0)=®0t®0t0¾2
f;t 6= t0;t;t 0 =1 ;:::;T; for Z 2Z 0;
Cov(Y1t;Y 1t0)=®1t®1t0¾2
f;t 6= t0;t;t 0 =1 ;:::;T; for Z 2Z 1












f; for Z 2Z 1;
Cov(Y12;Y 13)=a12a13¾2
f:
If we assume ®01 =1or ¾2
f =1 ; we can identify all of the rest of the factor loadings.10
With this information in hand, we can identify the variances of the uniquenesses, "0t;" 1t
of the outcomes:
Var("0t)=V a r ( Y0t)¡ ®2
0t¾2
f t =1 ;:::;T
Var("1t)=V a r ( Y1t)¡ ®1t¾2
f t =1 ;:::;T
Suppose that f;"0t;"12t;t=1 ;:::;T are normally distributed. Then from the information
just presented obtained from the subsamples associated with Z0 and Z1 we can identify
the density of f and hence the joint density of (Y01;Y 11;:::;Y0T;Y 1T). Using the outcome
















and we can identify ®03 up to sign and hence can identify ®02 and ®01. If we normalize ®01 =1 ,w e
can identify, ®02;®03 up to sign and ¾2
f. Since the sign of f is unknown, the sign of the factor loadings
is unknown. Using the data on Y1; under either normalization, we can identify ®11;®12;®13 since ¾2
f is
known.
21joint distribution of schooling choices across potential outcomes.
Inour companionpaper we show thatwe canobtain this joint density without a normal-
ity assumption for f or "0t;" 1t;t=1 ;:::;T. We extend our analysis to allow for vector f so
there may be many factors, not just one. We show that it is possible to nonparametrically
identify the joint density of potential outcomes provided that the number of panel data
wage measurements is large, in a sense we make precise in our companion paper, relative
to the number of factors.11 We do not need to invoke “identi…cation at in…nity” i.e.w ec a n
dispense with the requirement that there are subsets of Z where there is no selection. We
also consider a model with multiple discrete choices (schooling levels) instead of just two.
With these counterfactual distributions determined, we can identify the impact of social
policy on the distributions of outcomes and returns.
11In our companion paper, we show how indicators of f can be used to supplement, or replace, panel
data. This type of identi…cation is familiar to users of LISREL (see Joreskog and Sorbom, 1979).





















































































Distribution of Returns to College vs. High School
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